Fear Is Not a Conversion Button: How Advertising Films Can Show Risk Without Manufacturing It

Advertising Film Strategy Research 08/10 · ONCE Editorial

“Buy now or lose out.” “Only a few left.” “Miss today and it is gone.” These lines are often presented as applications of loss aversion. Yet prospect theory did not test whether one line of copy reliably increases conversion. It examined how people evaluate probabilistic gains and losses around a reference point. Turning a value function from risky-choice research into a fear formula for commercial advertising skips several questions: Does the audience believe the risk? Do they know what action can address it? Do they still have a meaningful choice? Can the product deliver what the ad implies?

This article’s central argument is that a gain or loss frame determines where the message begins, not where persuasion must end. If an advertising film presents risk, it should make at least four things clear: the audience’s reference point, a real and relevant consequence, the process by which a product or action changes that consequence, and a choice the audience can understand and, where appropriate, reverse. Remove any one of those elements and a loss frame can slip from helping people judge into manufacturing anxiety.

The search and page review for this article were current to 6 October 2026. We checked the foundational prospect-theory papers, recent work on framing and psychological reactance, meta-analyses of fear appeals and scarcity, and current Chinese advertising and promotional-pricing rules. This article reports no ONCE client experiment. It does not treat findings from health communication, charitable appeals, or risky lotteries as direct evidence of sales effects in commercial advertising.

Why “losses are worth about twice as much” is not a scripting method

Kahneman and Tversky’s 1979 prospect theory used changes relative to a reference point to explain choice under risk and described a value function that is generally steeper for losses. Their 1981 “Asian disease” problem then showed that presenting the same outcomes as lives saved or lives lost could change risk preference. These studies help explain why people do not evaluate only final asset levels and why the organization of a decision can matter.

They did not show that every loss message is twice as powerful as a gain message. The frequently repeated loss-aversion coefficient of 2.25 came from a specific estimate in Tversky and Kahneman’s 1992 cumulative prospect theory paper: 25 graduate students made choices involving mixed risky prospects. It is a parameter for that sample, task, and model—not an advertising-copy multiplier and certainly not an instruction to make negative words 2.25 times more intense.

In 2024, Walasek, Mullett, and Stewart re-estimated loss aversion in risky contexts using raw individual-choice data from 19 datasets drawn from 17 published articles. Their random-effects estimate was 1.31, with a 95% confidence interval of 1.10–1.53, and they also noted that data quality was often limited. That number should not become a replacement rule. The more useful lesson is that estimates of loss aversion change with measurement, samples, and tasks. An advertising team has no basis for treating one value as certain across categories, audiences, and media.

For production, the immediate implication is to stop asking only whether the gain or loss version will feel more forceful. Ask what viewers treat as the status quo. The statement “reduce monthly waste by 20%” may describe avoiding an ongoing loss for someone already paying for waste. For someone who has never used the category, it may sound like a future gain. The reference point is not contained in the subtitle. It comes from what the audience already has, expects to have, or believes it ought to have.

A risk frame has to pass four judgments, not one emotional template

ONCE translates the research limits into four planning questions: reference point, consequence, controllability, and choice. This is an original working method with stated limits, not a validated universal academic model.

First, where does the reference point come from? Is it current spending, an existing product, an industry standard, a previous experience, or an “ideal state” invented by the brand? If viewers do not accept the baseline, the loss is merely a loss the brand has declared on their behalf. A film can make the reference point visible through the same task in a current and proposed process instead of beginning by telling people what they are supposedly losing.

Second, is the consequence real, specific, and verifiable? Product risk, inconvenience, opportunity cost, and the cost of a wrong choice are different problems. A loss might involve time, rework, missing information, or irreversible harm, but each requires different support. Connecting distant disaster imagery to an ordinary buying decision may intensify emotion without improving information.

Third, can the audience take an effective action? Tannenbaum and colleagues’ 2015 meta-analysis covered 127 papers, 248 samples, and 27,372 participants. It reported a mean composite effect of d=.29 for fear appeals and stronger effects when efficacy statements were included; the included studies did not reveal an overall backfire effect. Much of the evidence, however, comes from health and public-safety communication, and the outcomes combine attitudes, intentions, and behavior. The narrow transferable proposition is that a message that introduces a threat has more reason to be tested when it also explains an effective, feasible response. It does not show that more frightening commercial advertising produces more sales.

Fourth, does the audience still understand its options? Controlling language can make people feel that their freedom is threatened. Li and Shi’s reactance meta-analysis, published online in 2025 and in print in 2026, synthesized 28 articles, 33 studies, and 146 effects. High freedom-threatening language was positively associated with anger, negative cognitions, and reactance. Gain versus loss framing itself did not show a consistent difference in reactance. A loss frame is therefore not automatically offensive. The greater danger lies in commands, shame, coercion, and removing choice.

These questions change the shot list. A reference point needs a credible baseline. A consequence needs a continuous action and its conditions. Controllability needs the response process rather than a polished result alone. Choice needs the relevant limits, next step, and exit conditions. They are not four lines of copy. They are four responsibilities for the film.

The same risk looks different from near and far

Psychological distance can change whether people focus on why an action is desirable or how it can be carried out. Experiments in social-media, health, and consumer settings have repeatedly found that more distant objects may fit abstract value and purpose, whereas closer objects may fit concrete feasibility and steps. Category, involvement, and stimulus design can alter these relationships, so the evidence does not justify a simple rule that brand films should always stay abstract while conversion films should always show steps.

A film can treat distance as an information-order problem. Someone encountering a risk for the first time may need to understand why it is relevant. Someone already dealing with the problem may need to see how the product works, whether it creates another burden, and what happens when it fails. A high price or high risk does not automatically call for a negative frame. The greater the consequence, the more likely viewers are to require conditions, comparators, support, and a reversible path—not merely stronger emotion.

Jarim Kim’s 2025 Journal of Consumer Behaviour paper offers an example of that interaction. Across two experiments with different levels of risk, gain framing was more effective in the low-risk study when risk perception was stronger; the difference disappeared when risk perception was weak. In the high-risk study, loss framing was more effective when risk perception was weaker; the difference disappeared when risk perception was already very strong. Anticipated regret was one mediator. The outcomes were primarily advertising attitudes and intentions, not purchases. For production, the paper argues against a universal answer: when viewers are already highly concerned, adding more loss may not provide new diagnostic information. When they have not recognized a relevant risk, accurately showing the consequence may help—but it still needs an actionable response.

This is why two kinds of risk should be separated. Product risk asks whether the product may produce an undesirable outcome. Decision risk asks whether purchase, trial, switching, or exit is too costly. The first may require testing conditions, limitations, and exception handling. The second may require trial terms, returns, compatibility, or a staged commitment. Framing both as “what happens if you do not buy” avoids the audience’s real concern.

A script should not stop at the bad outcome; it should return control

Consider a hypothetical dashcam. This is not ONCE client data and makes no performance claim about a particular product.

One script opens with collisions, disputes, and missing evidence, repeatedly insisting that people cannot protect themselves without a recording. It has a loss frame, but it does not show the conditions under which the device can help, how it is installed, how front and rear views relate, how the device signals its state, or how footage is reviewed, stored, and exported. Emotion enlarges the risk while the product avoids its responsibility to explain the response.

Another script can acknowledge the same genuine consequence while ordering information in four steps. It begins with ordinary driving to establish a reference point; uses one comprehensible dispute to explain the consequence of missing information; then shows the front and rear views, installation position, device feedback, and review process as a continuous sequence; and closes with conditions and a clear next step. The loss has not been removed. It has been placed back inside a relationship among consequence, response, and judgment.

ONCE’s public ecommerce product-video production page lists the VIOFO A229 Duo dual-channel dashcam case and describes how front and rear recording, road use, and device feedback are brought into one demonstration. For this article, we read the public page text; we did not complete a full film or sound analysis and have no performance data for the project. Within that limited observation, the example illustrates a production division of labor: the risk proposition may introduce the question, but product action and interface feedback let viewers judge how the device works. The case does not prove that the structure increased sales.

If a team has not yet established which part of the business problem a film could change, Episode 01, “Before Producing an Advertising Film, Test Whether Advertising Can Address the Problem”, provides the prior diagnostic step. Once a claim enters the script, Episode 04, “A Selling Point Is Not a Brief: Turning Claims into Filmable Proof”, assigns proof to shots. The stronger the risk claim, the more carefully source and proof must be separated; Episode 07, “Who Gets to Make the Claim?”, distinguishes what a person can say from what the product and records still need to establish.

Scarcity can be a fact; production cannot make a false fact true

Scarcity appeals are not identical to loss aversion, although they are often combined in one “urgency” playbook. A 2022 Journal of Retailing meta-analysis synthesized 416 effect sizes from 131 studies and found that scarcity effects varied with the source of scarcity, product type, and involvement. Many outcomes were purchase intentions. Limited quantity, limited time, and demand-driven scarcity are not the same information, and none automatically establishes incremental sales.

Scarcity can also carry a downside. Two studies by Biraglia, Usrey, and Ulqinaku in 2021 found that when consumers failed to obtain a limited-quantity product, anger could raise intentions to switch to another brand. This does not mean a brand should hide genuine inventory or a real deadline. It means that when an ad turns inability to obtain the product into pressure, viewers may attribute the resulting frustration to the brand.

China’s Advertising Law requires advertising to be truthful and lawful and prohibits false or misleading content. It places express constraints on claims involving performance, price, sales status, promises, and unverifiable surveys or statistics. Current State Administration for Market Regulation rules on promotions and platform pricing also require promotional conditions, duration, scope, and price information to be truthful, accurate, and clear. The relevant official pages were checked on 6 October 2026. This article is not legal advice; market, category, and fact pattern still require review by the responsible legal and commercial teams.

The production consequence is practical. Stock, campaign deadlines, original prices, comparison prices, and eligibility conditions should not be treated as replaceable “impact copy” added in post. At script approval, the team should know the source of each fact, when it was updated, where it applies, and who is responsible for removing it. If genuine scarcity cannot be supported consistently, do not film “almost gone” as a fact. Explain the real cost of the choice, the genuine benefit of acting now, or the actual consequence of waiting.

A shot-level check: what comes immediately after the consequence?

For every risk expression in a script, ask four questions:

1. What state will viewers treat as the baseline, and does the image make that baseline credible?
2. Is the consequence a known fact, a reasonable inference, or a hypothesis to test? Do the subtitle and image blur those categories?
3. By what process does the product or action change the consequence? Does the film show the complete step or only a polished result?
4. What choice remains? Are the relevant conditions, trial, return, consultation, comparison, or exit paths clear enough?

If a risk shot can only be followed by a more severe risk shot, the script is probably accumulating anxiety. If it can be followed by a real action, inspectable feedback, and an understandable option, risk begins to become useful information for a buying decision.

The call to action carries the same responsibility. “Buy now” may fit a low-risk, well-understood, reversible decision. For an expensive, complex, or compatibility-dependent offer, a more appropriate next step may be “check compatibility,” “book a demonstration,” “compare plans,” or “confirm service coverage.” A stronger verb is not a stronger strategy. The next step should match the uncertainty that remains.

A minimum test: compare frames without calling liking or intention sales

The following is a proposed experiment, not an ONCE client test.

Choose one real buying situation and one product fact. Create three low-cost pilots with similar information volume, brand presence, duration, and production quality. Version A emphasizes the gain from action. Version B emphasizes a real loss from inaction. Version C uses the same loss as B but adds a clear response process and a reversible choice. Do not give B stronger evidence than A, and do not use a fabricated countdown as the treatment.

Before exposure, record participants’ existing risk perception, product knowledge, whether they are making the decision now, and what they treat as the reference point. Begin with comprehension: can they restate the consequence, conditions, and how the product works? Then assess diagnosticity: can they distinguish suitable from unsuitable situations? Next examine reactance and trust: do they feel pressured, misled, or deprived of information? Only then observe a behavior appropriate to the purchase stage, such as completing a compatibility check, entering the same consultation flow, booking a demonstration, or purchasing under genuinely executable conditions.

Ad liking, self-reported anxiety, and purchase intention may help explain a process, but none independently proves incremental sales. If budget and sample size permit, preregister the primary outcome for real exposure and use a credible randomized control or holdout. If that is not feasible, limit the conclusion honestly to comprehension, judgment, or next-step behavior. Also define in advance what evidence would make the team change direction—for example, a loss frame increases urgency while reducing trust in the claim, or all three versions produce the same understanding, suggesting that framing is not the current bottleneck.

Conclusion: the purpose of risk communication is judgment, not fear

A gain frame can hide real consequences, and a loss frame can be accurate and restrained. The decisive issue is not positive or negative wording but completeness of information. A responsible risk-focused advertising film helps viewers understand where they begin, what may happen, what can be done, and what choices remain.

That is also why psychology cannot replace marketing diagnosis. Prospect theory directs attention to reference points. Fear-appeal research directs attention to efficacy. Reactance research directs attention to freedom of choice. Scarcity research directs attention to conditions. The final decision still returns to the product, the market, and the shot: Is the consequence real? Can the film show the response process clearly? If not, a stronger “psychological hook” merely turns up the volume on an incomplete promise.

If you are comparing scripts built around gain, risk, demonstration, and different calls to action, bring ONCE the product facts, target market, the audience’s current questions, and launch timing. Our TVC and campaign production approach puts the claim, action, scene, and versions into one filmable plan before deciding where emotion belongs.

References and access scope

1. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk”, Econometrica, 1979, 47(2):263–291. Full text read; this is risky-choice research, not a commercial-advertising experiment.
2. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice”, Science, 1981, 211(4481):453–458.
3. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1992, 5:297–323. Relevant estimates and sample description read in full.
4. Lukasz Walasek, Timothy L. Mullett, and Neil Stewart, “A Meta-Analysis of Loss Aversion in Risky Contexts”, Journal of Economic Psychology, 2024, 103:102740. Open full text read for datasets, estimates, and data-quality limits.
5. Jarim Kim, “When Gain/Loss Framing Exerts Its Effects and How”, Journal of Consumer Behaviour, 2025, 24(1):499–511. Formal abstract and publicly visible design and result details read; outcomes are not extrapolated into sales causality.
6. Melanie B. Tannenbaum et al., “Appealing to Fear: A Meta-Analysis of Fear Appeal Effectiveness and Theories”, Psychological Bulletin, 2015, 141(6):1178–1204. Open abstract, sample scope, and efficacy-related results read.
7. Mengmeng Li and Rong Shi, “Effects of Freedom-Threatening Language on Psychological Reactance”, Human Communication Research, 2026, 52(1):38–52; published online 30 June 2025. Formal abstract, inclusion scope, and reported effects read.
8. Felipe Reale Vieira Valenzuela et al., “Scarcity Tactics in Marketing: A Meta-Analysis of Product Scarcity Effects on Consumer Purchase Intentions”, Journal of Retailing, 2022. Formal abstract and synthesis scope read.
9. Simone Biraglia, Bryan Usrey, and Aulona Ulqinaku, “The Downside of Scarcity”, Psychology & Marketing, 2021. Publicly visible methods and result descriptions read.
10. China’s Advertising Law, the Interim Provisions on Regulating Promotional Activities, and the Rules on Internet Platform Pricing Conduct. Official pages checked on 6 October 2026; this article discusses only public requirements directly relevant to advertising claims, price, and scarcity expressions.